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ANTINOMIES OF "CULTURE"
George Markus!
Our notion of culture, which has a foundational significance formost of the humanities disciplines, is a typically modern
concept. To formulate it in a preliminary and intentionally paradoxical
way: this concept to a large extent reflects the ambiguities, un-
certainties and contradictions that pertain to modernity as culture; it
articulates and simultaneously veils or masks the difficulties and the
precariousness of the very project of cultural modernity. These
ambivalences and difficulties manifest themselves not only in the
now familiar observation that "culture" gains its meaning from an
opposition to "nature", an opposition as necessary as it is conceptually
untenable, self-deconstructing. For, in fact, each of these two
conceptual extremes is equally rent by multiple (interrelated, but
irreducible), explicit or implicit oppositions of the same character:
each of them possesses meaning through a series of systematic
distinctions that in no way can be brought to coherent unity. We are,
however-and this is the most important point to make-not
dealing here only with the systematic ambiguities of a static semantic-
conceptual field, ambiguities quite common in the case of concepts
constituted by "family"-type relations. For these become transformed
into active contradictions-dynamic antinomies-around which two
opposed tendencies, cultural processes and programs centre, each of
which attempts to resolve these ambiguities in its own way. The
culture of modernity is imprinted and defined by the irreconcilable
co-existence and struggle of these two projects. I shall call them
"Enlightenment" and "Romanticism", using these terms merely as
abstract ideal types: the concrescence of these opposites is manifested,
among other things, in the fact that it would be difficult to think of
any significant thinker of the modern age who could in all respects be
unambiguously situated on the one side of this divide.
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In speaking about our concept of culture, I mean a use of this term
that no longer refers to a state of (individual or collective) cultivation-
in its opposition both to the savage, primitive and to the overrefined,
decadent-but designates all that as inheritable work and accom-
plishment fundamentally distinguishes the human way of existence
from that of the animals: "culture" as embodied in those results of
social practices, humanly made material and ideal objectivations
that-in opposition to the senseless facticity of the phenomena of
"nature"-are endowed with, and transmit, meanings.
There is a well-known narrative that explains the emergence of
this conception (which actually took place around the end of the
eighteenth century). An instrumental-pragmatic conception of
knowledge as power, as tool of mastery-itself, of course, conditioned
by those basic social changes which inaugurated early modernity-
destroyed the traditional conception of nature as meaningful cosmos
or divine creation, as the source of norms. It was henceforth no
longer possible to understand the propriety or value of human
actions on the basis of their correspondence or non-correspondence
to assumed "natural laws". From now on it is nature (a mere "standing
in reserve" for all forms of human making) whose meaning for us
must be understood in terms of the requirements and potential of
our activities. This transformation alone, however, would leave
human actions without any common, binding standard and orientation.
The concept of "culture" is invented in order to make up this deficit
of norm and value. It also simultaneously consummates the self-
understanding of human beings as makers. We not only transform
nature according to our ends, but sovereignly create these ends and,
indeed, the whole system of meanings in terms of which we interpret
and direct our activities. We are not only the masters of all that is
external to us, but of our very lives as well.
This is, no doubt, a great story (today largely appearing as the
story of a fateful illusion), and I would not attempt to deny its
enlightening power. But it is also a quite simplificatory narrative that
glosses over important ambiguities and complexities, both historical
and conceptual. By way of introduction, I would like to begin their
schematic presentation not from the side of "culture", but from that
of its antithesis, the comprehension of "nature" in modernity.
Concerning the historical aspect of these complexities, I must
restrict myself to a bare reference. To make the desacralised,
scientific/instrumentalist conception of nature the direct, inevitable
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consequence of the idea and attitude of innerwordly "mastery" is to
overlook those powerful religious motivations which significantly
contributed to this development. For not only was man's dominion
over nature the fulfilment of his scripturally revealed vocation, but-
from Galileo on-the "new sciences" were conceived and legitimated
as readings of the second book of God. At times of religious un-
certainty, when the interpretation of God's first book-that of the
revelation-became a matter of sectarian conflicts, the sciences
promised to provide, by disclosing the secrets of nature, a rational
access to the divine plan of creation, to God's ultimate intentions for
the world and for man. This belief in the religious and moral
significance of science dominated not only the French Enlighten-
ment, but was much alive in Victorian science as well. And when the
sciences of nature are regarded as the source both of a manipulative
power and moral-religious insight, their object, "nature itself",
acquires contradictory features. One needs only to read Bacon:
nature is both what is to be subdued, "vexed", "put to the rack" and
what is to be listened to with humility, "courted" to be won over for a
chaste and lawful marriage-in his writings the attitudes of a
violently aggressive domination and empathic responsiveness
constantly alternate.
We are not dealing here, however, merely with matters of a bygone
age, even if we disregard the fact that quasi-religious interpretations
of science are hardly a thing of the past. For when nature is under-
stood in terms of the potentialities of human activity, it necessarily
acquires antithetical determinations that can be correlated in
opposed ways. Nature is, on the one hand, the matter to be formed
and the energy to be harnessed; being without its own ends, it is the
plastic material for our ends, the inexhaustible reservoir of the
undreamed-of possibilities of human productivity and control. On
the other hand, nature is at the same time the general name for all
that resists our intentions, for the infinity of a power whose inexorable
laws are beyond the compass of our will and, in their totality, beyond
our comprehension-it is precisely what has escaped our control.
There are two ways in which these opposed determinations can be
interconnected. One-corresponding to the familiar image of
modernity-is the tendency of "Enlightenment", perhaps best
summed up in the Marxian formula: Zuruckweichen der
Naturschranke-the idea of constant progress in the transformation
of blind, resisting nature into tamed nature, nature as material-
Literature andAesthetics
a step by step approximation to the infinitely distanced goal of
absolute mastery. But however dominant this notion may be in
practice, we should not forget that cultural modernity is charac-
terised by a no less constant countertendency. We are told again and
again that the idea of drawing nearer to an end situated in infinity
makes no sense, and with every triumph of control also the risk and
the fear of its unforeseeable consequences grow. And they are
answered by the no less modern demand to restructure, actively and
consciously, our relation to nature on the basis of an alternative
science and practice: to make again, but now primarily ourselves, to
live in accord with nature. This is the response of "Romanticism". At
least since German Romanticism (but we should add here also the
names of Fourier and the early Marx), there has been a continuous
tradition of utopias of reconciliation, plastic adaptation and dialogic
communication with nature, counterpoints to the utopias of
domination and mastery. The task is not to conquer and exploit
nature-which for us finite subjects means not the universe, but this
earth and its environment-but to make it (perhaps, make it once
more) our home. Nor were these projects merely utopian dreams.
The tradition of Romantic philosophies of nature-for example, A.
von Humboldt's integral science of concrete natural environments-
after having been neglected for so long, was rediscovered only quite
recently, not only as precursors of contemporary ecological thought,
but also in respect of their cultural impact, including their contributions
to the "hard" sciences themselves (to theories of electromagnetism,
chemistry, cell theory and so on).
The Romantic idea of reconciliation with nature is, however, not
only a subordinate countercurrent of modernity; the image of nature
that guides it is a fundamental, organic constituent of its culture. For
the image of, and attitude to, nature, which is opposed to its
comprehension as an alien, endless and valueless objectivity, is not
only a survival of pre-modern, religiously coloured ways of its under-
standing. A particular form of it has been produced on the proper,
entirely secular grounds of modernity itself. This is the idea of nature
as a self-presencing normative ideal which, at the same time, does
not dictate or impose upon us fixed rules: of nature as another
subject, the ultimate partner and respondent in the most human of
all our activities, in the various forms of play. This is a nature which
in its beauty and sublimity meets our deepest human needs (to use
Kant's words) with favour. It is neither the tamed, nor the wild
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nature, but the free nature of aesthetic creativity and attitude. As
Lukacs, Ritter and Marquard have convincingly demonstrated, the
conception of a cosmic or divine natural order does not come to be
simply replaced by that of an infinite universe whose lawfulness is
merely a matter of brute facticity. In modernity the first idea actually
bifurcates into the objectified scientific and subjectivised aesthetic
conceptions of nature.
This observation leads us directly to an important aspect of the
antinomistic character of the modern conception of culture. It would
be apposite-before attempting to characterise this latter in its
broader context-to discuss the point at which the nature/culture
dichotomy inevitably unravels: the notion of human nature. Such a
discussion would, however, transgress the permissible limits of a
paper. I must therefore confine myself again to the bare indication
that this notion now takes on the character of an undisguised
paradox, superbly expressed by Ferguson: "We speak of art as dis-
tinguished from nature; but art itself is natural to man".2 The
concept of culture simultaneously denaturalises humans as beings of
culture and significantly contributes to their naturalisation, since it
no more locates their distinction from animals in some supernatural
capacity which pertains to them "by their nature" (such as the
rational or immortal soul, and so on). Here again there are two
opposed and recurring ways in which this paradox can be dissolved:
by disclosing nature in culture or culture in nature. The first is
exemplified by attempts-from Tylor to sociobiology-to assimilate
cultural development to the laws of organic evolution, and equally by
theories which locate the basic preconditions of all cultural behaviour
in some natural givenness, like the wired-in neural program of the
brain in Chomsky or Levi-Strauss. The second is present in the
variously formulated (from Herder through Engels to Gehlen) under-
standing of humans as Mange!wesen, beings of lack (in respect of
natural-instinctual determinations), whose biological characteristics
themselves (including the cortical development of the brain) are to a
significant extent the outcome of prehistoric and historical processes
of acculturation.
If from these preliminary remarks we now turn directly to the
human world as the opposed supplement of "mere" nature, it again
appears to us under a double and contrasting conceptualisation,
corresponding to the bifurcation of the concept of nature mentioned
above. The world of human existence presents itself, on the one
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hand, as a vast causalfunctionalcomplex of patterned actions and inter-
actions with their more or less stable institutions and objectivations:
as society. On the other hand, it appears as the totality of enacted,
materially or ideally embodied meanings, a Sinnzusammenhang: as
culture. The typically modern disciplines of sociology and anthropology
emerged simultaneously and from that time on have persisted in an
uneasy, competitive relationship. It is "society" which must deal with
resisting nature, with nature as resistance. It is, however, "culture"
which is called upon to provide our activities that transform and
utilise nature as material with sense and a definite direction.
This latter, the modern concept of culture, is itself characterised
by a systematic ambiguity. The term has two distinct and, at the first
glance, completely unrelated meanings. On the one hand, in its broad
or anthropological seme, it designates some all-pervasive aspect of the
biologically non-fixed forms of human behaviour-in its dominant
contemporary understanding: the meaning-bearing and meaning-
transmitting, or "symbolic" dimension (Geertz) of human practices
and their objectivations-a11 that allows individuals of a community
to live in a life-world, the interpretation of which they share to a
significant degree, and thus to act in it in ways that are mutually
comprehensible. On the other hand, however, this very same term is
used-in its nan-ow or value-marked sense-to designate a circum-
scribed and narrowly specific set of social practices, primarily the
arts and the sciences: activities and their objectivations which under
conditions of modernity are generally regarded as autonomous, that
is, as being valuable in themselves.
The conflation of these two apparently unrelated meanings in a
single term is, however, not accidental. It is rooted in the origin of
our concept of culture in the historical Enlightenment. The Enlight-
enment invented the broad, anthropological notion of culture in its
struggle against particularistic traditions, which in their sacrality or
antiquity were binding upon, and constraining of, individuals: traditions,
which it summarily regarded as mere prejudices. "Culture" was a
battle-cry in the project to transform all the inherited/inheritable
accomplishments and works of human past-from the most humble
to the most sophisticated or exquisite-into a storehouse ofpossibilities
to be used freely and selectively for the creation of something new,
for rationally meeting the demands of changing conditions of
existence. But the Enlightenment organically connected such a non-
imitative, innovative attitude to life with the idea ofhumanperJectioning.
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Not simply unstoppable change, made possible by the ever renew-
able use of (broad) culture as a social resource, but the conferring of
a unique direction upon change towards the realisation of humanly
created, but universally valid, ends; ends which can be provided only
by culture in its narrow sense, by "high" culture as the complex ofsui
generis value-creating activities-this constituted the project of
Enlightenment. Just as the broad concept of culture was to replace
the idea of fixed and binding traditions, "culture" in its narrow sense
aspired to replace the spiritual, but irrational power of religion as the
ultimate orientation concerning the ends of life. Only scientific
and/or aesthetic education can render the people capable of rational
self-government-so declared both Condorcet and Schiller. The two
meanings of culture necessarily belonged together: culture as the
human way of collective life ought to be guided by the "high",
authentic culture which is directly rooted in man's creative freedom
and rationality
The adhesion and interdependence of these two analytically
unrelated meanings of "culture" is again not merely an accident of
history or an illusion of our past. For modernity itself reconfirms and
again necessitates this connection by its own immanent logic.
Paradoxically, modernity-regarding all historical societies as forms
of culture--ean conceive itself as a single culture in the broad sense
only if it relates the complex everyday activities of modern individuals
(this primary subject-matter of anthropological interests) to the
autonomous or institutionalised fields of culture in the narrow sense:
to high culture and its shadow, mass culture. Because under con-
temporary conditions these everyday activities do not have-as a
rule-both a socially shared/shareable and, for the acting subject,
experientially transparent meaning. The work activities of the
majority become technicised. They have for this majority no inherent
sense: their meaningfulness and rationality reside in the sciences
applied, which underpin the organisation of the process of production
as a whole, but which do not exist in the head of the labourer (and in
their totality do not exist in anyone's head). The broadly conceived
consumptive activities, on the other hand, become to a large extent
individualised and aestheticised-they appear as matters of personal
taste. No doubt, these seemingly so individual, inchoate adumbrations
of meaning are in fact organised by prefabricated and manipulable
social codes; for the individual consumer, however, these remain
opaque and veiled. The narrowly conceived, high or institutionalised
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culture of modernity objectively plays a larger role than ever before
in the organisation of the broad, everyday culture, but it is definitely
not the highest expression or systematisation of this latter. The two
must be thought of both as necessarily interrelated and as quite
incongruent.
The most important consequence of this state of affairs is the
frequent, or even dominant, self-perception of modernity as culturally
deficient, as a world lacking in meaning. And this deficiency can again
be articulated from two opposed viewpoints, depending whether
"technicisation" or "pseudo-aestheticisation" of worldly activities is
regarded as the defining symptom of its malaises. From the first
viewpoint, modernity appears as a world of incomplete and imperfect
demythologisation or disenchantment: a state of one-sided, truncated
rationality that reduces everything to the status of mere means, to a
system of universal fungibility which ultimately leaves the individuals
at the mercy of forces-a kind of "second nature"--<:reated, but
uncontrollable by them. From the second viewpoint, modernity
appears as a world of manipulated re-enchantment in which things are
enveloped by a fabricated halo of pseudo-aesthetic significations
mobilising unconscious impulses-not in order to unify, but to
reinforce the individual's competitive isolation and incapacity for
genuine communication.
The first diagnosis may then lead to the "Enlightenment" project
of carrying through the task of full rationalisation, of mastering now
the course and powers of history itself, to the utopia of a rational-
and rationally designed-society of the future. The second may give
rise to a yearning for the spontaneous cultural unity of a nostalgically
evoked past and to the "Romantic" idea of the willed advent of a
"new mythology", or-in a more pragmatic vein-to the fabrication
of "traditions" that would allow the individuals to regain the security
and warmth of some particularistic organic community. For, from this
latter standpoint, only such a community could provide the social
preconditions of an authentic individuation and stable personal
relations based on shared values irreducible to mutual egotisms and
interchangeable functional roles.
These two meanings/notions of "culture"-the broad and the
narrow-are, however, themselves---each separately---exposed to con-
siderable conceptual stress and paradoxes. As far as the first, anthropo-
logical, concept is concerned, I will restrict myself to some very broad
remarks-the bare minimum that the logic of this exposition wouJd
seem to demand, since concerning this topic I am hardly competent.
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"Culture" in its broad sense is both a universal and a differential
concept. It designates, on the one hand, that general attribute or
generic realm that all humans respectively share, in which they
necessarily participate. On the other hand, it signifies precisely what
distinguishes temporarily and/or spatially distinct societies from
each other: the complex of characteristics that unifies a particular
social unit in its contingent difference from the others. In both of its
aspects the concept is beset by problems. I have already referred to
the aporetic character of the idea of "cultural invariants": it seems
that empirically oriented theories of "cultural universals" must
ultimately locate them-precisely to ensure and legitimate their
universality-in "nature" as the opposite of "culture". Hut there are
difficulties in the particularising use of the culture concept as well.
The idea of culture as the specific difference that identifies one
social unit in its distinction from others runs counter to the fact that
every socially significant unit is itself culturally differentiated, or at
least contains a set of specific and distinct, often opposed socio-
cultural positions and roles. The differential notion of unique and
unitary cultures again proves to be an instable idealising construct
hypostatising the idea of macrocultural identity.
There is, however, another and more specific aspect of these latter
difficulties, concerning the comprehension of one specific culture (or
rather a set of such cultures sharing some basic generic characteristics):
that of modernity. I have already argued that, from the viewpoint of
the broad concept of culture, modern society appears as essentially
deficient. But at the same time-and from the perspective of this
very same concept-modernity takes on the character of the paradig-
matic or "most fully developed" culture because it is the culture
which self-reflexively knows itself as culture. By recognising all
others as equal cultures, cultural modernity posits itself as more
equal than others. It is its very particularity-that is, its self-reflexive
character-that makes it universal: the recognition of other societies
as "cultures" confers upon it the task and the right to
assimilate/acquireltake into possession their "cultural achievements"
(what it qualifies as such, of course).
This leads back to the question of the relation between these two
aspects of the broad culture concept-the universalistic and the
differential-the manner in which they can be thought and brought
together, and not only theoretically, but also in practical attitudes,
ideologies and projects. I shall mention here merely the fundamental
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types of opposition that emerge in this respect. Theoretically, a
straightforward evolutionism (a unifying reduction of differences
through their temporalisation) stands opposed to cultural relativism
(the codification and fixation ofdifferences through their spatialisation)
as the two poles ofanthropological theorising. Then, as far as ideological
attitudes are concerned, an "enlightened" cosmopolitanism stands
opposed-within the history of anthropology itself-to recurrent
forms of Romantic-nostalgic primitivism, and-in everyday social
consciousness-to various shades of ethnic or cultural nationalism.
Lastly, in terms of projects and strategies ofaction, the levelling idea of
a general modernisation squares up to programs of socio-cultural
separatism. These pairs of opposites, though in some respects
analogous, are not identifiable With, or reducible to, each other. Nor
can one attach a single unambiguous content and social significance
to them. "Modernisation" can be equally an externally imposed,
coercive force obliterating all differences, and an indigenous impulse
to improve one's lot and the standing of one's country. In a great
many cases it is a mixture of the two. "Separatism" can be the expression
of efforts to create a consciousness of collective solidarity for a
disadvantaged or stigmatised group in its striving for recognition and
autonomy. On the other hand, however, it can equally be an attempt
to conserve ossified power structures by insulating them from the
potentially destabilising effects of foreign contacts, not to mention
that it may well be a mere fa~ade for policies of apartheid or ethnic
cleansing.
These opposed trends and tendencies are, however, not restricted
to the comprehension and practice of intersocietal relations alone.
Analogues of them are operative and effective also within modern
societies. Modernity can equally be conceived (and, ofcourse, criticised)
as a society of universal levelling, whose mechanism effaces all differ-
ences, and as a society that externally imposes fixed differences upon
the individuals, confining them to ethnic zoos or social ghettos, and
forcing them to accept restrictive and exclusive, non-communicating
group solidarities. By dissolving the ascriptively pre-set, "in-born" as
it were, identities and forms of solidarities, modernity transformed
them into something to be created, but this leaves open the question:
created by whom? No doubt, under its conditions, identities can be
achieved, chosen or at least freely and consciously accepted: I am,
and choose to be, an Aborigine, aJew, feminine or working class. But
how much more often and more decisively are such identities
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imposed by others: you are-and don't try to hide or deny-an Abo,
a dirty Jew, merely a woman or just a crude upstart from the working
class. If culture is that reservoir of meanings in terms ofwhich identities
and solidarities are formed, modernity cannot escape the double
bind: in its self-reflexivity it cannot fail to recognise how far and how
radically its own culture is something made and re-makeable, and
simultaneously, how little can it be formed and even chosen by the
individuals.
This is perhaps the appropriate point at which to turn from this
rhapsodic digression, loosely connected with the broad, anthropological
notion of culture, to its conceptual supplement: culture in its narrow,
value-marked sense of "high" culture. For it may be thought that at
least in this more restricted sense cultural modernity escapes the
double bind. Because, according to its very concept, high culture is
precisely that which can only be genuinely created, on the one side,
and freely accepted, on the other side, since its appropriation is
nothing else but the act of its selective understanding.
The first thing, however, which strikes us if we turn our attention
to "high" culture is the fact that its notion emerged simultaneously
with, and makes sense only in relation to, a new opposite. This latter
may be called "popular", "commercial", "mass" and so on, but in
general means low culture, for its essential contents are usually
conceived of as (poor) substitutes for those of high culture. This is
again a modern dichotomy. It is true that most hierarchically organised
societies have made some distinction between activities befitting the
gentleman or gentlewoman being worthy to exercise for their own
sake, and those which are "servile", because valuable only in view of
the utility of what they produce or make happen-a distinction
between praxis and poiesis, between liberal and mechanical arts and so
on. But not only is it the case that the actual composition of the con-
cerned activities had very little in common with our divide between
high and popular culture. Even more importantly: the "servile" or
mechanical activities were in no way regarded as inadequate substi-
tutes for (or, perhaps legitimate competitors of) "liberal"
activities-they were codified simply as different in kind. What
women sang in the spinnery or in the fields was not considered as
comparable with a Gregorian mass in the church, just as the
performance of the ballad-singer at the fair was classed together with
that of the bear-dancer, juggler or beggar and not with what the
clerk/cleric was doing when writing learned verses in Latin. And I
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must say that, if these pre-modern segregations of human activities
served only to reconfirm, as untranscendable, the boundaries of
social inequalities, they also contained-in comparison with our own
dichotomy-a grain of sanity. For there is, I think, something
slightly absurd in the presupposition it suggests that liking rock
music is in some wayan alternative to listening to Schoenberg, or
that reading a thriller is a substitute-worthless or healthy-for
reading Finnegans ~ke.
But, of course, cultural modernity makes the thriller and Joyce,
the Rolling Stones and Schoenberg not only comparable, but actually
a matter of alternative choice. It does so by means of the very
process which first made the emergence of both these concepts, high
versus low culture, at all possible: the process of commodification. In a
bookshop or a CD-store the works mentioned are all there, stocked
just a few metres apart-for you to choose. It was commodification
that destroyed the network of patronage relations which directly
conferred an instrumental functionality upon works of high culture,
and just thereby made it possible for the Enlightenment to conceive
of them as works of high culture: as embodiments of free,
autonomous spiritual activities that alone can guide us towards
universally valid ends. It was, however, this same commodification
which immediately destroyed this illusion of the Enlightenment.
Open competition on the cultural marketplace resulted in works that
genuinely enlighten, or offer cultivated and cultivating pleasure,
losing out to those which-from the viewpoint of the Enlighten-
ment~xpressed and merely reconfirmed the worse prejudices and
the crude tastes of an uncultivated general public. To the ideal claim
pertaining to the very notion of a high culture, the claim to universal
significance and validity, stands opposed the undisputable fact of its
highly restricted and socially conditioned spread and effectivity. If
the idea of "high" culture originally expressed the hopeful project of
the Enlightenment, the immediately following conception of a
popular, in the sense of "low", culture articulated its frustrated dis-
illusionment with its incapacity to enlighten the "people", who, of
course, were then blamed for this failure as well.
As soon as this dichotomy became articulated, it was, however,
reshaped and re-interpreted by "Romanticism", which replaced
"popular" with "folk", or whatever other substitutes are found for it
(for example, "working class culture") in theories of cultural pop-
ulism. Just as the individual can acquire a stable and harmonious self-
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identity only if it is recognised by a supportive and cohesive commu-
nity, the objectivations of an autonomous high culture have genuine
value and significance only if they are rooted in the spontaneous and
largely anonymous creations of the appropriate collectivity. Only
then can the alienation of high culture, autonomously following the
dictates of its own logic and thereby becoming ever more separated
from the life-interests of the individuals, be overcome; only then can
its creations again become relevant for the conscious formation of
their self-identity. The struggle between the opposed understandings
of the significance and potentialities of high and low culture does not
begin with the dispute between Adorno and "cultural studies"-it
goes back at least to the beginning of the nineteenth century.
At this point a historical remark may be apposite. It is evident
that this dichotomy can be applied only to some components of the
value-marked concept of culture: primarily to the arts (broadly
conceived), to a lesser degree to the humanities, but not to the "hard"
sciences. We ought to remember, however, that from the middle of
the eighteenth century until that of the nineteenth, a struggle-and
during the French Revolution, a bloody one-was also going on
between two opposed conceptions of the sciences of nature: the
science of expert specialists versus "popular" science, a science based
upon everyday experiences or at least experiments performable as
popular spectacles and so open to the judgement of all and to the
active participation of amateurs. In this case, however, one side-
that of the experts-irrevocably triumphed, a victory institutionally
fixed by the destruction of local/regional academies and their
replacement by the professional organisations of scientist specialists.
Marat lost out-and not to Condorcet, but to Lavoisier. The latter
won, because his science-while retaining its autonomy as pure
science-acquired in the course of the nineteenth century a function
indispensable for the survival and continuation of modernity: it
became, in Marx's words of Capital, a "direct productive force". The
permanence of the dispute between the high and the popular arts indi-
cates that art, in all its varieties, possesses no such assured or presumed
functions, that any social significance it can attain to has to be invented
and probed out ever anew by the artist, the critic and the audience.
This is born out rather clearly by the very character of this
dispute. For what is constant in it is only the general structure of the
opposed evaluations and interpretations, not their actual contents,
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which prove to be not only variable, but interchangeable, depending
upon the current socio-political constellation and the strategies
found appropriate by cultural specialists for pursuing their differing
ideological objectives. Thus high culture can be upheld as a great
conservative force being the embodiment of that "canon" which
alone can ensure the preservation ofan endangered national (or more
broadly: Western) identity, in opposition to the fashion-driven
instability of an ever more international, and thus "alien", commercial
culture. But it equally can be presented as the sole bearer of a
radically critical or utopian attitude, since its very principle-
autonomy-essentially negates the universal domination of the profit
motive that permeates not only culture industry, but all walks of life.
And one can apply similar and similarly opposed characterisations to
popular or mass culture as well. On the one hand, it can be portrayed
as the mere instrument of cynical manipulation; on the other, it can
be argued that it owes its effective appeal to those real needs and
utopian impulses, which it unconsciously and unwittingly expresses.
All these operations are, no doubt, facilitated by the fact that it is
always the critical intellectual who actually defines which works of
art are truly autonomous or genuinely popular.
Lastly, it is not only the opposed evaluations of this dichotomy
that structurally pertain to cultural modernity-equally persistent
are the attempts to overcome this divide, and again from opposite
directions. The Enlightenment project of gradually raising the
culture of the general public to the level of autonomous high culture
still lives on, achieving a small victory in every Pride and Prejudice on
the TV and in every blockbuster exhibition of impressionists.
I should not, however, be too ironical in this respect, without con-
fessing to my nostalgic sympathy with it: I still would like to believe
that making universities socially more accessible does not necessarily
mean their transformation into educational marketplaces providing
"customers" with specialised training, in outright denial of their idea
as institutions ofgeneral education.
On the other hand, efforts to overcome this divide by abolishing
the autonomy of art through its reunification with life or by
imploding it from within-from the historical Romanticism through
Dada to post-modernism-have been no less vital and persisting.
These recurring efforts have been no more successful than the first
ones. The ability of institutionalised art to "musealise" (and to
commodifY) works of anti-art is truly impressive. Today not only are
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Duchamp's "Fountain" or the exact replicas of Tatlin's projects
hallowed museum exhibits, but, through photos and videos, "happen-
ings" or Christo's landscape art have also taken their peaceful place in
museums of contemporary art.
Here at last, at the end of this topographic survey, we have arrived
at the narrow concept of culture, at high culture itself. One can
distinguish schematically a fourfold accomplishment or outcome of
this conceptualisation, or rather of those socio-cultural processes,
which it actively expresses and articulates.
First, this concept unifies a number of social practices and their
products that are quite heterogeneous in regard to both their immanent
characteristics and their traditional social evaluation. It unifies them
not simply by assigning them to a single general category, but by
conceptually homogenising them in some essential respects. Activities are
admitted to the realm of high culture only on the following terms:
I. If they can be conceived not merely as performative-as exercises
of individual capacities-but as objectifying activities, producing
"works" of some kind.
2. If they are not merely reproductive, but "creative", their
"works" being novel and original.
3. If their objectivations, in whatever way be they materially
embodied, can be regarded as having a general significance solely
because they are essentially ideal objects: complexes of meaning.
4. If their significance, the validity of these meanings, can in
principle be judged according to criteria wholly internal to these
practices and, at the same time, directly related to basic human
values-in the classical understanding, to beauty and truth.
It was the result of cultural transformations and struggles lasting
centuries (a good example is the rise of opus music and the triumph
of the idea of a "musical work of art" as against the understanding
and practice of music as improvisatory performance) that some
social practices became endowed with, and submitted to, these
demands of objectivisation, novelty/creativity, idealisation/demateri-
alisation and autonomy, and only in this way was our idea of high
culture formulable and comprehensible at all. Furthermore, not only
did the general notion of high culture emerge through such a
homogenising unification: its basic constituents are also the outcomes
of similar processes of conceptual amalgamation. Not only is our
concept of "art"-with its subdivision into its five classical kinds-
the result of a post-Renaissance development that reached its
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conclusion only at the end of the eighteenth century. The paradig-
matic form and concept of "science"-that of the "hard" natural
sciences-also came into being only by abolishing divisions that even
early modernity-from Bacon to the French Encyclopedie-intended
to preserve: the boundary line between deductive "natural philosophy"
as the form of necessary knowledge and empirical "natural history" as
the form of contingent, merely probable knowledge.
Second, by means of this homogenisation high cultural activities
became demarcated from, and elevated above, other forms of social
practices: they are posited now as activities whose works represent
immanent values, which are valuable independently of any possible
subsequent use. Their autonomy meant emancipation from any fixed
and pre-set social task and it was realised through processes of social
disembedding and defunctionalisation. This in no way implies the
denial of their social significance, the negation of their ability to fulfil
socially essential functions. Only it is not this latter which directly
determines their value; it is the satisfaction of their immanent value-
criteria that is thought of as endowing them with such a capacity.
This posited connection between the realisation of some funda-
mental values, on the one hand, and definite codified and specialised
practices, on the other, resulted at the same time in an enormous
value reduction. In a society that claims to be able to produce truth
and beauty regularly in ever new objectified forms, other values-
values which in pre-modern societies were certainly regarded as no
less binding and fundamental-take on the character of a diminished
or questionable objectivity. The "good" and the "sacred" retreat, on
the one hand, into the interiority of private conscience and faith. On
the other hand, they are now "up for grabs", they become objects for
the contending forms and powers of institutionalised high culture,
each promising alone to deliver, guarantee or substitute for them.
Because, and this is the third point to make, high cultural practices,
despite, and against the background of, their homogenisation, are
dichotomically organised into a conflictual field. High culture consists
of the arts and the sciences codified as polar opposites, with the
humanities in a no-man's-land somewhere in-between. In the
sciences and arts respectively, reason stands opposed to sensuous
imagination; impersonal and depersonalised objectivity to the
irreplaceable self-expression of individual subjectivity; an institution-
ally restricted form of communication to an indefinite and culturally
open one; novel discoveries surpassing and invalidating their own
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tradition to original works which merely add to and extend this
tradition, conferring upon it new meanings and renewed relevance;
and so on.
At this stage it would be not only impossible, but hopefully also
unnecessary and boring to elaborate the point that around these
contrarieties are formed the opposed projects of an "enlightened"
scientisation and a "Romantic" aestheticisation of culture, or, more
ambitiously, of life in general. Under the conditions of cultural
modernity, the scientific and aesthetic "attitudes" have become
universalised: they no longer have some pre-established domain
deemed appropriate to the "dignity" of their interests. Anything and
everything can, in principle, become the object of scientific invest-
igation or of aesthetic experience (and artistic representation). Their
requirements and criteria of validity, however, exclude each other.
They enter into conflict, a Weberian war of the gods. The culture
wars of modernity-some aspects of which have already been
mentioned-are to a significant degree struggles for hegemony
between these adversaries and for the relegation of the other to the
position of a subordinate supplement. There is, however, one con-
sequence of this on-going competition that pertains to the very
nature of modern high culture and which deserves to be mentioned
separately as the fourth aspect of its outcomes: the progressive erosion
of the substantive content of the values that originally legitimated the
autonomy of high cultural activities.
The modern sciences, emancipated from forms of direct social
control, were originally presented as the cognitively and methodo-
logically certain way, the sole safe path, to the discovery of objective
truth. With the autonomy of their development, however, objective
truth itself became identified ever more closely with what the
sciences can actually deliver-and what they can deliver is precisely
the bone of contention in our culture wars. Thus suspicion arises
that, in fact, "truth" means no more than what is pragmatically
serviceable to the general domination of those social powers
which-indirectly at least-eo-determine their development. The
autonomous arts promised to create ever-new works of beauty, but
their own evolution has outgrown and shattered this value concept.
What their widely differing trends and practices can offer today is
some illusive and contentless aesthetic quality in general, a mere
name for what they deliver in common, if there is such a thing at all.
They are therefore open to the suspicion that they merely provide
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material to make old social distinctions in new and more subtle ways.
As a result, the very notion of"culture" now appears in an ambivalent
light. Is it something deeply important, the analysis of which is
fundamental for any attempt to understand (and perhaps to
challenge and change) modernity? Or is "culture" merely the "opium
of the idle", and the preoccupation with it only a way of avoiding
inquiry into "society"?
As this process of erosion continues, suspicion also falls upon the
projects of "Enlightenment" and "Romanticism". This is, I think, a
perfectly legitimate and sane suspicion. What they promised and tried
to achieve-the idea of a scientifically designed, rational society versus
that of the aesthetic realisation of imagined, close communities-are
not so much distant utopias, but diystopias and dangers. Nor is it
possible-as I tried to illustrate-to ascribe some stable, constant
social-political significance to either of these tendencies, even as an
open, uncompletable project. Neither of them is inherently progressive
or reactionary, democratic or elitist, whatever these words may mean.
But the suspicion directed towards them, however legitimate it
may be, is also futile. For "Enlightenment" and "Romanticism" are
the two great projects and tendencies structurally related to cultural
modernity. While both aim at overcoming the multiple ambiguities
and antinomies of its constitution, their see-saw struggle is actually
the mechanism by which this very structure is dynamically repro-
duced and owing to which modernity achieved and continues to
achieve as much cultural integration as it is capable of accomplishing.
This summary statement is not, however, a conclusion that may
legitimately be drawn from the present paper, which only aims at
providing a conceptual topography: an ideal ising description directed
mostly at the past. It merely expresses a personal opinion, something
which-according to Hegel (and I concur}-has no place in philosophy.
I could perhaps reformulate it to accord better with the modest
claims this paper can raise. But since philosophy also demands from
its practitioners not to hide behind an enigmatic incognito concerning
their relation to the pressing problems of the present, I rather choose
here, at the end, to go on with this mere opining, by trying to give
some inconclusive answers to two possible objections against this
illegitimate, but emphatic, non-conclusion that I have just formulated.
One objection that might be raised points out that the historical
failure of all the great attempts to reconcile or synthetise "Enlighten-
ment" and "Romanticism" in no way proves the illegitimacy or
44
George Markus
impossibility of such an endeavour in general. This is certainly true-
in fact, I doubt whether philosophy, with the inherent vagueness of
its concepts, can provide stringent proofs of historical impossibility.
Nevertheless, I would reply to this objection by indicating that such
a desired or hoped for reconciliation is just what actually took and
takes place in the on-going history of modernity through the very
strife of these opposed tendencies. For "Enlightenment" and
"Romanticism" not only consistently failed, they also consistently
succeeded-though no doubt in unforeseen and unsatisfactory ways.
Not only did the technicisation and scientisation of the life-world
proceed together with its ever-growing aestheticisation, but it was
also the successful advance of an "enlightened", objectifying attitude
to nature that simultaneously transformed the whole earth into a
human habitat, the "home" for the whole of humanity-even if in a
way that for Romanticism would be the mockery of this idea. But it
was the growing "mastery" of nature which broke down the trad-
itional division of the environments into the domesticated, befitting
humans, and the spheres of an alien beyond: the wild, appropriate
only for subhumans, and the sacred as the locus of the divine. Today,
tourists trample where the gods once dwelt, and photographs, films
and television bring every corner of the earth into our homes with
reassuring familiarity. The idea of "reconciliation" certainly implies
something other and more than this mutual advancement of opposed
tendencies through the constant struggle of institutionally separated
realms, each striving for exclusive universality. It demands the
establishment of a well-defined and stable space for each within an
encompassing, preferably moral, framework. For this very reason,
however, this idea amounts not to the overcoming of the contradictions
of modernity, but to the abandonment of modernity itself, for it
denies that conflictual, agonistic pluralism that is the basic source of
its dynamism.
Such an overcoming of modernity is, however, precisely what is
actually happening, or has already happened, at least in respect of its
culture-this may well be a second objection raised in the name of
"postmodernity". From the viewpoint of its representatives, the
antagonism between "Enlightenment" and "Romanticism" has now
become irrelevant, since the orienting categories in terms of which it
has been and can only be formulated-the contrast between high and
low, elite and mass, left and right, "real" and "virtual"-have in fact
lost their validity. In so far as this is intended-as is usually the
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case-to represent the description of what is the actual situation
today, it seems to me (to put it mildly) a gross overstatement.
Without question, there are signs of genuinely structural changes in
contemporary culture: forms of scientific communication are
changing due to the information revolution, and also in the arts
tendencies may be observed towards de-objectivisation, dissolving
the traditional concept of a work of art, towards rematerialisation,
and so on. These are, however, still partial and by no means dominant
trends, whose long-range consequences are exceptionally difficult to
foresee.
If, however, what are actually utopias or dystopias of a future are
now appearing in these theories as straightforward descriptions of
the present, this is symptomatic. It is symptomatic of a state of
affairs where the projects of Enlightenment and Romanticism are
becoming increasingly irrelevant, but irrelevant for a very specific,
single group of social actors: the intellectuals. This term usually
designated not cultural specialists in general, but specialists in
cultural critique and the critique of culture. Traditionally, it was the
intellectuals who formulated, again and again reformulated, and
spearheaded the feuding projects of Enlightenment and Romanticism.
This is a role, however, which-in my judgmental opinion-is
becoming ever more difficult to fulfil consistently with good intellectual
conscience today. More importantly, however, intellectuals are no
longer really needed for this purpose-this role has been taken over
largely by the genuine experts: the managers and PR persons of
various cultural institutions and media, and their patrons and allies in
social and political establishments. In future, the traditional intellectual
may become the new structurally unemployed of cultural life. And
this is, I think, a danger, because it would undercut the uneasy, but-
in modernity-persistent connection between culture and critique.
One may even argue that this task has never been more necessary
than now, when culture in its various meanings and constituents has
become deeply entrenched institutionally: to raise the question of
the good in relation to its separated, autonomous realms. Are they
"good"-in what respect, for what and for whom? But the problem of
whether there are still coherent intellectual positions which no
longer subscribe to the illusions of "Enlightenment" and "Romanti-
cism", and from which such questions can be meaningfully and con-
vincingly raised-this is a problem not for this paper, merely descrip-
tive in its basic content, but perhaps for the collective reflection of
all of us who live from, and perhaps to some degree also for, culture.
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Notes
Some of the basic ideas of this paper concerning the constitutive role of
"Romanticism" in modernity originated in conversations and correspon-
dence with my Melbourne friends, David Roberts and Johann Arnason,
who are presently engaged-together with Peter Murphy-in a large
project about the "Dialectic of Romanticism". I am deeply indebted to
them-though, of course, I am solely responsible for the way these ideas
are articulated in this essay. And I have much benefited from the criti-
cism and advicee of Zygmunt Hauman, Agnes Heller and Janos Kis have
offered in respect of an earlier variant of this paper.
2 Adam Ferguson, An Essay on the History ofCivil Society (New Brunswick,
NJ.: Transaction Books, 1980, first published 1767), I.i, p. 6.
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